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Abstract 
We aim to improve upon the existing empirical literature on international risk sharing 
under three dimensions. First, we generalize dynamic multi-equation approaches to the 
estimation of risk sharing channels, by adopting a Heterogeneous Panel VAR model. 
Within this framework, the coefficients representing the extent of risk sharing achieved 
through the different mechanisms are allowed to vary across countries. Second, we 
introduce two new risk sharing channels – namely, government consumption and the real 
exchange rate (that we further decompose into relative prices and the nominal exchange 
rate) – which allow us to investigate the role of fiscal policy and international price 
adjustments in the absorption of macroeconomic shocks. Third, we establish a better link 
between the “channels” empirical model and a theoretical formulation of the risk sharing 
condition which allows for PPP violations. Our empirical analysis, for a set of 21 OECD 
countries over 1960-2016, contributes to identifying the geographical structure and 
dynamics of risk sharing channels and to describing their evolution in the latest half-
century. For the OECD sample as a whole, we confirm through 2016 the strong smoothing 
role played by credit markets and the small degree of risk sharing achieved through factor 
incomes. Interestingly, government consumption tends to have a dis-smoothing effect, 
due to its counter-cyclical movements. Another noteworthy result is the negative risk 
sharing effect of the real exchange rate, driven by the dis-smoothing role played by the 
movements of the nominal exchange rate, only partially offset by relative price 
adjustments. The evolution of these risk sharing mechanisms is diverse, but the most 
important channels – namely credit markets and real exchange rate adjustments – exhibit 
slightly positive trends for the first half of the period, negative trends afterwards, and a 
recovery in more recent years. Our results demonstrate that the extent of risk sharing is 
strikingly different across countries, especially if we take into account valuation effects 
through the real exchange rate. Even considering only traditional risk sharing channels, 
the country-specific magnitude of risk sharing on impact ranges from around 15% to over 
80%. In addition, dynamics are also quite diverse across countries; for example, risk 
sharing through credit markets, while quite effective on impact, provokes dis-smoothing 
for about two thirds of the countries from the second year onwards. Our approach is of 
particular interest for policy makers, as it allows identifying the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the institutional and behavioral risk sharing mechanisms at work in 
different countries. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Sed quis metus dolor. Nam 
congue cursus ligula sed faucibus. Fusce ligula est, mattis ut ullamcorper id, vulputate 
nec urna. Curabitur sit amet nisi eget urna ornare ultrices. Cras eget facilisis dolor. Sed 
id velit sit amet dui ornare dapibus at et lorem. Donec erat lacus, dapibus a massa at, 
euismod hendrerit leo. 
In open economies with complete markets, the maximization of a large class of 
utility functions implies that domestic consumption growth should be independent of 
idiosyncratic variables (notably domestic output growth). Econometrically, β should be 
zero in cross-sectional regressions of the form: 
 (1.1) 
where C, Cj, GDP, and GDPj are world consumption, domestic consumption, world GDP, 
and domestic GDP, respectively, the disturbance term may include a measurement error 
and/or preference shocks and the α intercept captures the effect on consumption growth 
of unobservables which are constant across countries.1 
Early tests (Lewis 1996, Crucini 1999) focused on the acceptance or rejection of the 
null hypothesis (β=0), but the successive literature interpreted 1-β as a measure of the 
degree of international risk sharing achieved by the countries under study. 
The empirical literature on risk sharing was spurred by Asdrubali et al. (1996), who 
developed a variance decomposition scheme which breaks down the overall level of 
smoothing, 1-β, into several regression coefficients, each quantifying a different 
implementing mechanism, or “channel” (international factor income, international 
transfers, and credit markets): 
                                                                                      (1.2) 
Where the RHS βz‘s are interpreted as the degree of risk sharing achieved by each 
channel. The history of the “channels” literature, at least from a methodological 
viewpoint, is the history of the econometric techniques introduced to best estimate the 
coefficients in (1.2). 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998), followed by many others, 
adopted a panel SUR set-up, which constitutes a parsimonious and tractable estimation 
approach that takes into account various non-spherical disturbances, including cross-
equation correlated errors. Asdrubali and Kim (2004) picked a different point on the 
trade-off curve between simplicity and thoroughness, and introduced a multivariate 
panel VAR model which allows endogenizing output and taking into account the 
dynamics and feedbacks among the variables. In fact, a VAR model treats all the 
variables in the system, including output, as endogenous, and allows dynamic feedback 
among those variables. In addition, such a framework can explicitly extract exogenous 
shocks and trace their dynamic effects. As a consequence, one can distinguish the 
effects of different kinds of shocks (e.g., shocks to GDP and to each smoothing channel) 
at different time horizons. At the same time, the VAR approach addresses the 
endogeneity problem arising in a static SUR specification, by accounting for the 
feedback from each component of output or each smoothing channel onto output. 
Additionally, within this methodology it is possible to answer several other relevant 
                                           
1 See the seminal papers by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994). 
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policy questions, like identifying the speed of adjustment to shocks, or whether the 
different channels have acted as substitutes or complements.2 
The methodological contributions of our paper are threefold. First, we generalize the 
panel VAR approach in Asdrubali and Kim (2004) by allowing for country heterogeneity 
in risk sharing. Following recent developments in the econometrics of panel VAR, we 
employ a specification where the assumption of identical parameters in all countries is 
relaxed, and each country has its own specific model of risk sharing. The main 
advantage of this approach is that we can estimate rigorously country-specific risk 
sharing channels, thus providing a finer geographical description of risk sharing 
mechanisms with respect to previous contributions.3 As far as we know, this is the first 
time that heterogeneous panel VAR models are used to estimate risk sharing. To capture 
the possible evolutionary patterns of risk sharing we also estimate our panel VAR models 
using a rolling window and track the time-varying behavior of the different smoothing 
channels. Second, we provide a sounder theoretical foundation to the channels 
framework, by linking more closely the empirical model to the risk sharing condition. In 
particular, our empirical model will ultimately relate output growth with private 
consumption growth, instead of overall – private and government – consumption 
growth (as in the standard “channels” literature). In so doing, we introduce a novel risk 
sharing channel, namely government consumption adjustment. Third, we introduce 
another fundamental smoothing channel – valuation effects on relative consumption 
through the real exchange rate adjustments. This had not yet been analyzed in a 
dynamic channels framework, although real exchange rate behavior has often been 
discussed in the risk sharing literature. Furthermore, we decompose this latter channel 
into the contributions of relative price and nominal exchange rate adjustments. Through 
the smoothing effect of government consumption and of the real exchange rate, we will 
present a novel perspective on the role of public expenditure in dampening business 
cycle fluctuations in OECD countries, as well as on the role of the real exchange rate on 
impact and in the medium run. 
We apply our methodology to a large macroeconomic dataset, namely a sample of 
21 OECD countries over the 1960-2016 period. This reliable source of data has been 
repeatedly used to gauge risk sharing estimates among various countries and over 
different time periods, which will provide for useful comparisons of our results. 
As Kose et al. (2009) point out, the recent literature presents conflicting results on 
international risk sharing, even for advanced economies. While some studies suggest 
that risk sharing has increased during the recent globalization era (see, for instance, 
Sørensen et al., 2007, and Giannone and Reichlin, 2006), or alongside with financial 
integration, some others found little evidence of increased risk sharing (Kose et al. 
2003, Moser et al., 2005, Kose et al., 2009, and Bai and Zhang, 2012). Balli et al. 
(2013) underline that most of these findings relate to a period of financial upturn fueled 
by the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Our approach, applied to a long 
time span encompassing distinctive sub-periods up to 2016 and measuring individual 
countries’ shock-absorption capabilities, helps to shed light on the different dynamics 
of risk sharing in the last 50 years, also at country level. Such dynamics might explain 
                                           
2 Recent reviews of the literature on risk sharing can be found in Ahrend, Arnold and Moeser (2011), who point 
out the need to develop collective risk sharing mechanisms, and Pierucci (2014) that reviews the empirical 
literature on risk sharing and the effects of economic and financial integration on risk sharing. 
3 Early analyses of risk sharing (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1992, Pakko 1998) were based on bilateral cross-
country income and consumption correlations; however, these measures – even in their more recent 
specifications as in Brandt et al. (2006) – do not provide an accurate estimate of overall risk sharing (see 
Artis and Hoffmann 2008) and are not particularly informative on its dynamics. There have been also studies 
– such as Mélitz and Zumer (1999) or Sørensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007) – which introduced the idea 
of varying β coefficients. However, these papers impose a specific structure on β based on the interaction 
with control variables and, therefore, only focus on the effect on the risk sharing estimates of these 
interacted variables. Finally, Pierucci and Ventura (2010) and Fuleky, Ventura and Zhao (2015) provide a 
single-equation error-correction model which allows for heterogeneity but cannot identify the risk sharing 
channels and their dynamics. 
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the conflicting results emerging from the recent risk sharing literature. As another 
example, different views exist on the functioning of risk sharing in the face of a financial 
shock, such as the subprime crisis of year 2008. By studying the effects of a shock to 
a risk sharing channel, our VAR approach can uncover the dynamics of the responses 
to shocks of various origin, and assess the extent of substitutability/complementarity 
among risk sharing channels. 
In summary, in this article we attain several goals:  First, we estimate a 
theoretically-founded VAR model to analyze the magnitude and interrelations of 
smoothing channels at work within the OECD economies. Second, we generalize the 
panel VAR approach by allowing for countries heterogeneity in the parameters, as well 
as for the risk sharing role of government consumption and real exchange rate 
adjustments that are further decomposed into the relative price and nominal exchange 
rate adjustments. Third, we use our methodology to improve and update the 
measurement of risk sharing for a group of industrialized countries commonly used in 
the empirical analysis over different time periods.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the method 
employed. In section 3, we present our empirical results. Finally, in section 4 we present 
some concluding remarks. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
Consider a world of J stochastic endowment economies, each populated by an 
infinitely-lived representative agent exhibiting time-separable Von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utility over a composite (per capita) nondurable consumption 
good, possibly different across countries.4 Uncertainty is represented by a state variable 
st which summarizes history up to time t, and can take on countably many values at 
any date t. In this set-up, the Pareto-optimal (per capita) consumption allocations 
satisfy for all st:5 
  
 
ߩ௝ ௖ܷ൫ܥ௧
௝, ߜ௧௝൯ܴ௧௝
௖ܷ൫ܥ௧ିଵ௝ , ߜ௧ିଵ௝ ൯ܴ௧ିଵ௝
= ߤ௧ߤ௧ିଵ 				 ݆ = 1,… , ܬ 
 
 (2.1)
where ρj is country j’s factor of time preference, ܴ ௧௝ = ௉೟
∗௘೟ೕ
௉೟ೕ
 is the real (effective) exchange 
rate, defined as the price of the world aggregate consumption basket in terms of country 
j's consumption (݁௧௝being the nominal (effective) exchange rate, defined as the price of 
the world currency basket in terms of country j's currency, ௧ܲ
௝  the price level in country 
j, and ௧ܲ∗  the world aggregate price index), δtj is a shift parameter (capturing the effect 
of factors different from consumption affecting utility, such as tastes, leisure, non-
tradables, durables, government consumption, home production),6 Ctj is (real) 
consumption evaluated at domestic price, and μt is the Lagrange multiplier associated 
with the feasibility constraint, divided by the probability of occurrence of state st. 
This condition states that at the optimum, the discounted growth of marginal utility 
– evaluated at world prices – is the same in every country and, given aggregate 
consumption, is independent of individual countries’ endowments. The consequences 
for country consumption growth can be illustrated by specifying a log utility function: 
ܷ൫ܥ௧௝, ൣܾ௧௝൧൯ = ܾ௧௝ log ܥ௧௝ 
where bjt is a multiplicative shock. In this case, after taking logs and differences in both 
sides of (2.1), we obtain: 
log ቆ ܥ௧
௝/ܴ௧௝
ܥ௧ିଵ௝ /ܴ௧ିଵ௝
ቇ = log ߩ௝ + logቆ ܾ௧
௝
ܾ௧ିଵ௝
ቇ − log ൬ ߤ௧ߤ௧ିଵ൰ (2.2)
The optimal risk sharing solution thus prescribes that real country consumption 
growth evaluated at world prices – net of preference shifts ൤log ൬ ௕೟
ೕ
௕೟షభೕ
൰ , log ߩ௝൨ and given 
real world aggregate consumption growth represented by log ቀ ఓ೟ఓ೟షభቁ – must be 
independent of idiosyncratic country variables, notably endowment. The consequence 
is consumption smoothing across countries evaluated at world prices, given the RHS 
terms in (2.2). For example, in the presence of deviations from purchasing power parity 
                                           
4 Generalizations have been developed to a production economy (Cole and Obstfeld 1991, Stockman and Tesar 
1995). 
5 See Kollmann (1995) or Cavaliere, Fanelli and Gardini (2008). 
6 See Canova and Ravn (1996). 
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(PPP), domestic consumption should grow faster when the consumption price is 
relatively depreciating, thereby smoothing the ratio on the LHS of equation (2.2). 
The optimal solution can be decentralized and implemented, fully or in part, through 
several mechanisms, depending on the commercial, financial and institutional structure 
of the economy. For example, the existence of complete markets of Arrow-Debreu 
contingent claims (Arrow 1964), or a specific set of securities (Duffie and Huang 1985), 
allows economies to implement the full risk sharing solution through portfolio 
diversification.7 Such optimal allocation can also be approximated – and under certain 
assumptions even attained – in a bonds-only economy, provided that the endowment 
shocks are all transitory (Baxter and Crucini 1995, Levine and Zame 2002, Willen 1999). 
Similarly, the existence of appropriate supra-national (federal) tax/transfers 
mechanisms allows subsidizing, at least partially, those countries whose endowment 
has been hit by a negative shock, drawing from country endowments hit by a positive 
shock. In addition, risk sharing can be provided through self-insurance, that is by asset 
accumulation (saving) and depletion (dissaving) through (domestic or international) 
lending and borrowing. Furthermore, we consider the risk sharing role of domestic 
government consumption, which can operate as a clearing house, absorbing output 
shocks before they hit domestic (private) consumption. For example, during a 
recession, a reduction in government consumption may free resources for private 
consumption. Finally, the optimal risk sharing allocation may be reached through 
movements in the real exchange rate, eliciting valuation effects and transfers of goods 
and financial assets. Cole and Obstfeld (1991) have shown that, for certain restrictive 
parameter choices, commodity trade alone can attain the full risk sharing allocation, 
even in the absence of international asset markets or international transfers. More 
generally, they have identified a mechanism that can attain (partial) risk sharing 
through adjustments in the terms of trade and – depending on its correlation with the 
terms of trade – in the real exchange rate.8 In addition, a long-standing literature in 
open economy macroeconomics (e.g. Obstfeld 1985) has studied the risk sharing 
properties of the real exchange rate in relation to the nature of the shocks to output. 
For example, a productivity-driven output shock would be smoothed by the valuation 
effect of the ensuing real depreciation of the consumption basket. Note that, in the 
empirical analysis, we divide the real exchange rate adjustments into relative price and 
nominal exchange rate adjustments to infer the separate roles of these two factors. 
This paper aims to quantify the five decentralization mechanisms mentioned above. 
In fact, the main idea of the "channels" literature is that there is mileage to be gained 
in allowing these multiple implementation mechanisms to operate jointly, and in 
exploring their individual contributions to risk sharing. To this purpose, like much of the 
work on risk sharing channels, we maintain a very general setup by not assuming any 
specific market or institutional structure for our economies, and let the empirical 
analysis reveal the extent of risk sharing achieved by each channel. We also refrain 
from restricting the empirical framework by modelling endogenous frictions leading to 
market imperfections (such as limited commitment or enforceability).9 In fact, the 
stylized facts and statistical linkages that we uncover will help shed some light precisely 
on the most appropriate market and institutional structure or endogenous market 
imperfections characterizing the OECD economies in the period under exam. 
 
                                           
7 A similar mechanism is at work not only through cross-border capital income flows, but also via transboundary 
labor income flows. 
8 See for example Heathcote and Perri (2002). 
9 As a matter of fact, our model can hold in a decentralized equilibrium independently of asset market 
completeness, or trade frictions and goods market imperfections (including shipping and trade costs, as 
well as sticky prices or wages) that can cause large deviations from the law of one price and PPP (see 
Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc 2008). 
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2.2 Empirical Model of Risk Sharing Channels  
 
2.2.1 A Baseline Specification 
As illustrated by equation (2.2), if risk is fully shared through market or non-market 
institutions, given preference shifts and given world aggregate consumption, real 
country consumption growth at world prices should not respond to idiosyncratic shocks 
to domestic variables, for example real country output growth at domestic prices. We 
analyze the empirical implication of full insurance starting from the regression 
coefficient of the (idiosyncratic) real country consumption growth at world prices (i.e. 
deviation from real world aggregate consumption growth at world prices) on the 
(idiosyncratic) growth in real country GDP at domestic prices (i.e. deviation from real 
aggregate GDP growth at world prices) at any lag l: 
∆௟ܿ̃௧௝ = ߙ௝ + ߚ௝∆௟݃݀݌௧௝ + ݑ௧௝ (2.3)
where lowercase letters indicate logs,  such that applied to any variable zt 
produces  for any finite l, a tilde indicates a variable at constant world 
prices, the disturbance may include a measurement error and both the dependent and 
the independent terms are expressed in deviations from the corresponding (log-difference 
of the) real world aggregate. In a panel setting, the αj intercept captures the effect on 
consumption growth of unobservables constant over time (including ߩ௝ and some of the 
time-invariant factors embedded in ܾ௧௝, such as leisure, home production, etc.), whereas 
the deviation from the aggregate corresponds to a time effect controlling for the influence 
of aggregate variables, notably aggregate consumption or aggregate income growth.10 In 
addition, the varying βj coefficient captures additional (possibly country-specific) 
parameters affecting the relation between GDP growth and consumption growth. Full 
insurance implies that for each country the β coefficient is equal to zero; on the other 
hand, no insurance implies that this coefficient should be one.11 A useful – albeit ad hoc 
– interpretation of (2.3) is that countries may pool into risk sharing arrangements only a 
fraction 1-βj of their domestic GDP (growth), whereas the remaining fraction βj co-moves 
with domestic consumption (growth) (that is, it is captured by the  term).12 
Country-specific preferences (time preference coefficients and other factors such as taste 
shifts), appearing in equation (2.2) are instead captured by the error term. 
As argued by many researchers, such as Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and 
Fafchamps (2011), the βj coefficient captures the extent to which the economy manages 
to smooth consumption in the face of output shocks. In other words, 
1 − ߚ௝(݈) = 1 − ܿ݋ݒ(∆௟ܿ̃௧
௝, ∆௟݃݀݌௧௝)
ݒܽݎ(∆௟݃݀݌௧௝)
 (2.4)
is an appropriate measure of the extent of country j’s consumption smoothing via risk 
sharing at any time horizon l. 
                                           
10 In some formulations of the risk sharing model, the term log(μt+1/μt) is specified as aggregate consumption 
growth (e.g. Mace 1991), and at times it is added as a regressor (e.g. Obstfeld 1994). However, in a panel 
setting it is replaced by the time effect.  
11 Note that if no risk sharing mechanism is at work (including commodity trade), the real exchange rate does 
not apply and on the LHS we simply have domestic consumption growth. 
12 The existence of a fraction of country output not pooled in the risk sharing agreement is motivated, among 
other considerations, by transaction costs (Crucini 1999 and references therein) or by the fact that a 
significant fraction of households own near-zero net worth (e.g., Wolff 1998). 
l
l L−=Δ 1
ll -ttt zzz −=Δ
j
tl
j gdpΔβ
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The main contribution of the risk sharing channels methodology consists in a 
decomposition of the overall risk sharing measure 1-βj into the smoothing contributions 
of the different risk sharing mechanisms mentioned in section 2.1 above, aimed at 
capturing how GDP shocks propagate through the economy. For every country, we use 
the following variables: 
• GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
• GNI (Gross National Income) = GDP + NFI, where NFI stands for net factor 
income13 
• GDI (Gross Disposable Income) = GNI + NIT, where NIT stands for net 
international transfers14 
• C+G (Total Consumption, TC) = GDI - S, where S stands for national savings15 
• C (Private Consumption) = TC – G 
• Ĉ (Private Consumption deflated by relative prices) = C×P/P*  
• C ̃ (Private Consumption in PPP) = C/R, where the real effective exchange rate, R 
= e×P*/P; e is the nominal effective exchange rate, P is the domestic price level 
and P* is the world price level. 
  
The econometric model is based on the idea that, if two successive income measures 
do not co-move, the smoothing mechanism represented by their difference is at work. 
For instance, to the extent that GDP and GNI do not perfectly co-move, it means that 
cross-border factor income flows have provided a smoothing (or dis-smoothing) effect 
whenever the correlation of the two measures is non-negative (or negative). By the 
same token, to the extent that GNI and GDI do not perfectly co-move, it means that 
international transfers have provided further smoothing (or dis-smoothing). Take the 
following identity: 
ܩܦ ௧ܲ௝ =
ܩܦ ௧ܲ௝
ܩܰܫ௧௝
× ܩܰܫ௧
௝
ܩܦܫ௧௝
× ܩܦܫ௧
௝
(ܥ + ܩ)௧௝
× (ܥ + ܩ)௧
௝
ܥ௧௝
× ܥ௧
௝
ܥመ௧௝
× ܥ
መ௧௝
ܥሚ௧௝
× ܥሚ௧௝ 
 
(2.5)
After taking logs, applying the  operator and taking deviations from cross-
sectional aggregates we obtain: 
 
∆௟݃݀݌௧௝ = ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝ − ∆௟݃݊݅௧௝൯ + ൫∆௟݃݊݅௧௝ − ∆௟݃݀݅௧௝൯
+ ൫∆௟݃݀݅௧௝ − ∆௟(ܿ + ݃)௧௝൯ + (∆௟(ܿ + ݃)௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ௧௝)
+ (∆௟ܿ௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̂௧௝) + (∆௟ܿ̂௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝) + ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝ 
(2.6)
 
where lowercase letters again indicate logs and all the terms are expressed in deviations 
from the corresponding (log-difference of the) real world aggregate. Multiplying both 
sides by ∆௟݃݀݌௧௝ and taking expectations: 
                                           
13 Net factor income is the difference between income inflows and outflows accruing to the residents in a country 
due to their international net asset holdings and cross-border labor compensation. 
14 Net international transfers correspond to the net flows of money accruing to residents in a country as a 
consequence of cross-border financial transfers without an economic counterpart. 
15 National savings include not only private savings (by households and firms), but also public savings by the 
government. 
l
l L−=Δ 1
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ݒܽݎ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ ൰ = ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟݃݀݌ − ∆௟݃݊݅ ൰ + ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟݃݊݅ − ∆௟݃݀݅ ൰
+ ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟݃݀݅ − ∆௟(ܿ + ݃) ൰ + ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟(ܿ + ݃) − ∆௟ܿ ൰
+ ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟ܿ௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̂௧௝൰ + ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟ܿ̂௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝൰ + ܿ݋ݒ ൬∆௟݃݀݌ , ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝൰ 
Dividing both sides through by , we obtain a constrained sum of simple 
regression coefficients:  
1 = ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟݃݀݌௧௝ − ∆௟݃݊݅௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
+ ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟݃݊݅௧௝ − ∆௟݃݀݅௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
+ ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟݃݀݅௧௝ − ∆௟(ܿ + ݃)௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
+ ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟(ܿ + ݃)௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
+ ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟ܿ௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̂௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
+ ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟ܿ̂௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
+ ܿ݋ݒ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧
௝, ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝൯
ݒܽݎ൫∆௟݃݀݌௧௝൯
 
 
or, 
1 − ߚ௝(݈) = ߚி௝(݈) + ߚ்௝(݈) + ߚ஼௝(݈) + ߚீ௝(݈) + ߚ௉௝(݈) + ߚ௘௝(݈) (2.7)
For each country and for each lag l, the overall risk sharing measure 1-β is 
decomposed into 6 regression coefficients, which aim to capture the five risk sharing 
mechanisms mentioned in section 2.1.16 Following the literature on risk sharing 
channels (e.g., Sørensen and Yosha 1998), the first coefficient on the RHS – ߚி	– 
measures international factor income risk sharing, namely the percentage of a shock to 
output growth that is smoothed through cross-border flows of factor incomes; the 
second –  – the percentage of the shock to output growth that is further smoothed 
by international current transfers; the third –  – the additional smoothing provided 
by domestic and international credit markets through asset increase/decrease; the 
fourth –  – the further amount of smoothing provided by government consumption; 
the fifth – ߚ௉	–  the smoothing achieved through relative price adjustments; the sixth – 
ߚ௘	– the final degree of smoothing achieved through adjustments of the nominal 
effective exchange rate. Note that the empirical literature on risk sharing channels has 
always made the alternative assumption that government consumption is a perfect 
substitute of private consumption, and thus is part of the country “consumption 
aggregate” – that is, it is to be modelled as a smoothing target, not a smoothing 
channel; hence, equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) would stop short of the last three 
terms. Our set-up instead adds a smoothing channel via government consumption, 
allowing for the possibility of imperfect substitutability with private consumption. In so 
doing, our framework allows for both roles of government consumption, thereby linking 
the empirical model to the theory (couched in terms of private consumption), while 
maintaining the comparison with previous work. Additionally, our set-up introduces 
                                           
16 Equations (2.5) and (2.6) further break down the real exchange rate channel into its components, namely 
relative prices and the nominal exchange rate. 
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another novel channel – movements of the real exchange rate – which helps smooth 
the real PPP value of the (per capita) consumption growth of the country. 
 
2.2.2 A Heterogeneous Panel VAR 
Heterogeneous-parameter equation systems based on (2.3) are a natural approach 
to the estimation of the coefficients in (2.7). However, static estimators such as in Mélitz 
and Zumer (1999) or Sørensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007), and single-equation error-
correction models allowing for heterogeneity such as in Pierucci and Ventura (2010) 
and Fuleky, Ventura and Zhao (2015) may fall short of capturing the complex dynamics 
of risk sharing channels introduced by Asdrubali and Kim (2004) or Becker and 
Hoffmann (2006). Indeed, notwithstanding its success and its wide use in empirical 
analyses of risk sharing, the standard regression-based static approach has various 
shortcomings in comparison to the VAR-based approach. First, in the standard 
approach, dynamic aspects of risk sharing are not fully taken into account, as the 
right-hand side of the model only includes contemporaneous idiosyncratic GDP and the 
univariate structure imposed on the error term is limited. An advantage of the VAR is 
that it provides a complete description of the moments of the data at all leads and 
lags.17 Hence, the dynamic risk sharing profile is a closed-form function of the VAR 
parameters. If we were to obtain an estimate of the risk sharing profile from a sequence 
of regression equations at different horizons l = 1, 2, . . . , L, the analytic link between 
the different βl’s  for l = 1, 2, . . . , L would remain blurred. We think it is preferable to 
model the patterns of temporal (and cross equation) dependence by using a VAR. In 
addition to capturing dynamic dependence properly, a VAR model can trace how 
dynamic properties of risk sharing change over time in the presence of GDP shocks by 
exploiting impulse response functions. Second, the standard approach leads to 
consistent estimates of the parameters only if idiosyncratic GDP is exogenous. Since 
we estimate the VAR in reduced form, all the variables in the RHS are predetermined, 
which allows us to tackle the issue of endogeneity. Third, in a VAR set-up we can easily 
discuss the interactions among risk sharing channels. Shocks to risk sharing channels 
can be identified in the VAR model and impulse responses to risk sharing channels can 
be analyzed.  
Panel VARs take into account both the cross-sectional and time dimension. We will 
not restrict the dynamic behavior of the economies to be the same across countries, 
but allow for heterogeneity, given that our time dimension T is large enough and our 
sample includes several recession periods where the behavior of the different countries 
has been diverse. Additionally, the sample includes countries from different parts of the 
world and might be affected by different economic policies.18 In our VAR-based 
approach, to obtain estimates of risk sharing for any horizon l, we will consider, for each 
country j, the conditional moments of the vector: 19 
                                           
17 Cavaliere et al. (2008) conclude that the lack of risk sharing in Europe found in numerous static studies could 
be due to the rich dynamic structure underlying consumption streams. 
18 However, to avoid the curse of dimensionality (see Canova and Ciccarelli 2013), our starting point will be a 
panel VAR without dynamic interdependencies across countries. 
19 Given the identity in (2.6), for every country j and period t, the ∆ܿ̃௧௝equation can be written as an exact linear 
combination of the other equations included in our VAR setup and, therefore, does not add any new 
information into the system but rather induces exact multicollinearity. Hence we did not include this variable 
in the VAR. 
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௧ܺ
௝ =
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ ∆݃݀݌௧௝
∆݃݀݌௧௝ − ∆݃݊݅௧௝
∆݃݊݅௧௝ − ∆݃݀݅௧௝
∆݃݀݅௧௝ − ∆(ܿ + ݃)௧௝
∆(ܿ + ݃)௧௝ − ∆ܿ௧௝
∆௟ܿ௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̂௧௝
∆௟ܿ̂௧௝ − ∆௟ܿ̃௧௝ ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 
 
Under standard assumptions, ௧ܺ
௝ has a VAR representation of the form: 
  ߔ௝(ܮ) ௧ܺ௝ = ߝ௧௝ + ݀௝      (2.8)  
where ߔ௝(ܮ)	is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, which satisfies the condition that 
the roots of det(ߔ௝(ܮ))	lie outside the unit circle. Note that we do not allow ௧ܺ௝ to have unit 
roots and to be potentially cointegrated. The term ߝ௧௝	is uncorrelated multivariate white 
noise with a diagonal variance-covariance matrix and the vector ݀௝collects country-
specific intercepts.  
 For ease of exposition, we will re-write equation (2.8) in terms of the lag of order 
p: 
  ߔ଴௝ ௧ܺ௝ = ݀௝+ߔଵ௝ ௧ܺିଵ௝ + ⋯+ ߔ௣௝ ௧ܺି௣௝ + ߝ௧௝    (2.9)   
for j=1,…,N countries, where ߔ଴௝, ߔଵ௝,… , ߔ௣௝ are the matrices of coefficients embedded in 
the polynomial matrix ߔ௝(ܮ).	 
Following Asdrubali and Kim (2004) and Becker and Hoffman (2006), we identify the 
impulse response functions by imposing a recursive zero restriction on contemporaneous 
structural parameters where contemporaneously exogenous variables are ordered first in 
 (Sims 1980), following the logic of National Accounts.20 This is equivalent to applying 
the Choleski decomposition to the variance-covariance matrix of the error term of the 
reduced form of the VAR. 
Asdrubali and Kim (2004) for panel VAR models and Becker and Hoffman (2006) for 
panel error correction models (ECM) assumed that the parameters for all the countries 
were the same, and pooled all the data to estimate the model. However, differences in 
risk sharing patterns have often been conjectured as being linked to uneven economic 
evolutions of OECD countries. For example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014) relate the recent 
collapse in risk sharing of peripheral European Union (EU) countries (namely, Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) to the fact that their governments did not save during 
the expansionary phases of the business cycle and were not able to borrow on the 
international markets during the crisis due to the high levels of outstanding public debt. 
The great recession and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe led to an 
asymmetric behavior of the different member countries of the EU, and therefore the 
homogeneous-parameter model could be improved upon by allowing for country 
heterogeneity.  
The econometric tool that allows us to cope with cross-sectional heterogeneity (while 
keeping the dynamic feedback among the variables and considering them as endogenous) 
                                           
20 GNI logically follows GDP, in the sense that you need an output to generate dividends, 
interests, rents, etc. By the same token, GDI follows GNI because taxes presuppose a 
taxable income; and so on. 
tX
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relies on heterogeneous panel VARs.21 Asdrubali and Kim (2004) compute impulse 
response functions after a GDP shock hits the system. In this paper we follow their 
approach, normalizing the impulse response functions by the total/cumulated effect of a 
GDP shock on GDP after 5 years to 100 and rescaling the effect smoothed through each 
channel as a ratio to the total effect on GDP. A positive (negative) number is interpreted 
as smoothing (dis-smoothing). Notice that since we are using impulse response functions 
to evaluate risk sharing, we can compute it k lags after a shock is produced, k = 
0,1,2,…We will make explicit the lag we are using whenever it is needed. 
The impulse response functions will be given as the coefficients of the following sum: 
			ܺ௧௝−௝ = ෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
 
where ௝ is the unconditional mean of ௧ܺ௝ and the matrices ܦ௞௝ are those of the moving 
average representation of the system in terms of the structural shocks. Given the 
identification restrictions, they are functions of the reduced form parameters. These 
impulse response functions have a simple and elegant interpretation. Given the identity 
in (2.6), denoting as ( )z for Z = Y, F, T, C, G, P, e the 1st, 2nd,…, 7th row of the moving 
average representation of the VAR, it follows that: 
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
௒
= ൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
ி
+ ൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
்
+ ൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
஼
+ ൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
ீ
+ ൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
୔	
+൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
ୣ
+ ∆ܿ̃௧௝ 
The first implication of this identity is that we can recover analytically the impulse 
response function for ∆ܿ̃௧௝, the unsmoothed response of consumption at world prices to 
the GDP shock. Then, the dynamic multipliers at each lag l=0,1, …., L relative to each 
GDP shock are linked by the following relation: 
߲
߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
௒
= ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
ி
+ ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
்
+ ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
஼
+ ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
ீ
+ ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
୔
+ ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
൭෍ܦ௞௝ߝ௧ି௞௝
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
൱
ୣ
+ ߲߲ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝
∆ܿ̃௧௝ 
where ߝ௧ି௟,௒௝  denotes the shock associated to GDP of country j at time t-l. In other words, 
the response of GDP to a GDP shock at each lag can be broken down into a smoothing 
(or dis-smoothing) component (the first 6 terms in the RHS) and an unsmoothing 
component (the last term).22 As explained above, the last term cannot be included in the 
system because of its linear dependence, and will be recovered analytically, by 
subtracting the total effect of a GDP shock from the sum of the effects smoothed through 
each one of the channels. The same argument holds for shocks to each smoothing 
channel, all enjoying the same property that the relative multipliers sum to the own 
channel multiplier.23 
 
                                           
21 See Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) for a survey on panel VAR models. 
22 Just solve for డడఌ೟ష೗,ೋ
∆ܿ̃௧௝ in the last equation in order to recover the unsmoothed part at each lag. 
23 This result is the IRF counterpart of equation (2.7). 
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2.2.3 Estimation and Data 
Given that we allow for heterogeneity, the pooled estimator is not consistent (see 
Pesaran and Smith, 1995, and Rebucci, 2010). Instead of pooling the information and 
estimating a unique set of parameters, as it is done in the homogeneous panel VAR 
model, given that T is large enough in our data set, we will estimate the model for each 
country j. Since we are ultimately interested in estimating an average impulse response 
function for the entire sample, we follow the suggestion by Canova (2007, chapter 8) 
and compute the impulse response functions for each country and average them over 
the cross section. Let ω be the vector that collects the population mean parameters and 
߱௝ the same vector for the parameters of country j=1,…,N. Let hk be the impulse 
response function evaluated at lag k=1,…,K, a well-defined  continuous function of the 
parameters of the system. To simplify the notation we drop the index k relative to the 
lag and make the following assumption regarding the impulse responses across 
countries j=1,…,N at every lag k: 
ℎ(߱௝) = ℎ(߱) + ߥ௛௝        (2.10) 
where ߥ௛௝, j=1,…,N,  are iid (0,σ2) and represent the deviation of country j’s effect from 
the “typical” or average effect. While the overall measure of risk sharing for each 
country will be given in terms of the total parameters for each country, ߱ ௝, the measure 
of global risk sharing for a set of countries, which can be labeled as h, will be computed 
as the mean group estimator as follows: 
ℎ෠ெீ = ଵே∑ ℎ( ෝ߱௝)ே௝ୀଵ        (2.11) 
An estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the mean group estimator for h is given 
by: 
Σ෠௛ = ଵே(ேିଵ)∑ (ℎ( ෝ߱௝) − ℎ෠ெீ)(ℎ( ෝ߱௝) − ℎ෠ெீ)′ே௝ୀଵ     (2.12) 
 Notice that we use the cross section to estimate the common or average effects 
by pooling the estimators of the impulse response functions. The cross correlations 
among variables in the model are picked up through the contemporaneous cross 
correlations of the reduced form residuals.  
Annual data from OECD National Accounts for the period 1960-2016 are used in our 
empirical application. In this way, we can compare our findings with other results 
available in the literature for the same set of countries. The OECD countries included in 
the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. The main sources of 
data are AMECO – the annual macro-economic database of the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) – and the OECD 
Statistics database. We use the AMECO database since it provides harmonized statistics 
on all the variables required to perform the analysis and for the whole sample period 
1960-2016, leaving some missing information only in a very limited number of cases.  
The nominal variables Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Net Factor Income (NFI), 
Gross National Income (GNI), Net International Transfers (NIT), Gross Disposable 
Income (GDI), Total Consumption (C+G) and Private Consumption (C) have been taken 
from AMECO and have been transformed in real per-capita terms, dividing nominal 
values by population and the consumption deflator. We have computed real effective 
exchange rates series for country j using import and export weights ݓ௧௜ for each time t 
and country i, as follows: 
			ܴܧܧܴ௧௝ = ෍
ݓ௧௜ ∙ ܥܲܫ௧௜ ∙ (ܧܴ௧௝/ܧܴ௧௜)
ܥܲܫ௧௝
ே
௜ୀଵ,௜ஷ௝
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where ܥܲܫ௧௝ is the Consumer Price Index of country j in year t, and ܧܴ௧௝ is the nominal 
exchange rate of country j’s currency against the US dollars at time t. Private 
consumption evaluated at world prices has been computed as ܥ௧௝/ܴܧܧܴ௧௝.  
Next, the series in our VAR model have been made stationary by computing their 
log differences. To build the idiosyncratic shocks of each variable we have computed 
the difference between each variable and its cross-country weighted average. In order 
to construct the averages, we have followed the weighting procedure described in Beyer 
et al. (2001), where the aggregation is performed directly on growth rates but using 
time-varying weights of countries that are given by their relative share in the aggregate 
measured in a common currency. Just to define the weights we have used country-wide 
aggregates instead of aggregates in per capita terms. In this way, for instance, larger 
countries like Germany or the US have a greater share in the “world” GDP than smaller 
countries with higher per capita GDP.  
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3 The Empirical Results 
 
We estimate an individual VAR for each country, compute individual impulse 
response functions and then pool the estimates to obtain the mean group estimator as 
suggested in Canova (2007) and Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) for large T panels. We will 
present the results stemming from the effects of shocks to GDP on individual channels 
and the effects of shocks to individual channels.  
Table 1 shows the individual country and mean-group estimates for the 
contemporaneous responses of the various channels to a GDP growth shock. These 
estimates can be compared to those usually obtained in the literature through the static 
panel regression approach. Recall, however, that our analysis adds the amount smoothed 
through government consumption and relative price/nominal exchange rate adjustments. 
For ease of comparison we add several columns containing different aggregates for risk 
sharing. Column 1 shows the names of the countries in alphabetical order. Columns 2 to 
4 show the smoothing taking place through the three standard channels considered in 
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Asdrubali and Kim (2004). Column 5 is the sum of 
columns 2 to 4 and is reported to allow comparisons with traditional estimates available 
in the literature. Column 6 introduces private consumption smoothing through the 
government consumption channel. Column 7 shows total private consumption smoothing 
and is the sum of the traditional channels plus the government consumption channel. 
Columns 8 and 9 show the effect of the real effective exchange rates decomposed into 
the relative price effect (column 8) and the nominal effective exchange rate effect (column 
9). Since we transform the variables and take logs and first differences, what appears in 
columns 8 and 9 are adjustments through inflation differentials and nominal exchange 
rate growth, respectively. Column 10 shows total smoothing achieved, comprising 
valuation effects, as the sum of all channels. Our first estimation sample runs from 1960 
to 2014.24  
Overall, for all countries we observe that the credit markets channel is responsible 
for most of the smoothing (34% for the mean group estimate) and is statistically 
significant. In the remaining traditional channels, on average, we do not detect a strong 
contribution to smoothing: risk sharing achieved through the factor markets channel is 
1% on average, while no smoothing took place through international transfers. These 
estimates are consistent with most studies on risk sharing covering OECD countries (or a 
large subset thereof).25 
The new findings are, first, that government consumption plays on average a dis-
smoothing role, amplifying shocks to GDP growth by 4%. Indeed, while a counter-cyclical 
government consumption might contribute to output stabilization by dampening business 
cycle fluctuations, such a counter-cyclical policy action can be detrimental to risk sharing. 
For example, in our sample a negative output shock leads to an increase in government 
consumption, which further reduces the resources that the private agents can use for 
consumption, given the reduced output growth.  
Second, as for real exchange rates, there are sound theoretical reasons to expect 
both a smoothing and a dis-smoothing effect of relative prices. Open-economies real 
exchange rate models, such as Obstfeld's (1985), suggest that positive productivity 
shocks generate an excess supply which depreciates the real exchange rate; on the 
contrary, when differences between tradable and non-tradable sectors are considered, as 
in the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, positive productivity shocks, which mainly benefit 
                                           
24 Years 2015 and 2016 have been dropped to guard against recent outliers such as the real Irish GDP growth 
rate, which was above 25% in 2015. We have also estimated the model with the sample ending in 2016 
(see Appendix 1). The results remain essentially unaltered for all the countries but Ireland. The changes in 
Irish results hardly affect the mean group estimators. 
25 For example, Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Balli, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sørensen (2012) or Leibrecht and Scharler 
(2012). 
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tradables, result in real exchange rate appreciations. Our results from mean group 
estimators show that the ratio of foreign to domestic price level increases – thus reducing 
private consumption deflated by relative prices – implying a positive role of relative price 
adjustments by 18%, but the nominal exchange rate appreciates to increase private 
consumption at PPP, implying a negative effect of nominal exchange rate adjustments by 
30%.26 Overall, the real exchange rate appreciates, thus decreasing real private 
consumption at PPP (relative to real private consumption at domestic prices) by 12% on 
average, which suggests a dis-smoothing effect of real exchange rate adjustments. That 
is, positive shocks to GDP appreciate the real exchange rate, which leads to an increase 
in real private consumption at world prices (relative to real private consumption at 
domestic prices) through valuation effects. Our results on real exchange rates are 
consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc 
(2008), who report real exchange rate appreciations following US technology shocks.27 
Our results are also consistent with Backus and Smith (1991) who documented the 
negative correlation between consumption and the real exchange rate, which is against 
the full risk sharing hypothesis in the presence of non-tradables (the so-called Backus-
Smith puzzle). 
Third, we note that the degree of risk sharing is strikingly different across 
countries. This suggests that modeling heterogeneity is crucial. Table 1 also shows 
heterogeneity across countries in the importance of each channel. The credit channel is 
the more significant to smooth consumption, as it always cushions, to a greater or a 
lesser extent, GDP shocks; however, it also exhibits clear heterogeneity in the amount of 
smoothing achieved. In particular, credit markets smooth over 50% of shocks in Belgium, 
Finland, and Norway, but less than 15% in Portugal and Spain. For total risk sharing by 
the three traditional channels, the country-specific magnitude of risk sharing on impact 
ranges from around 15% to over 80%. The role of relative prices is positive and significant 
in almost all countries. However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the smoothing 
of the nominal effective exchange rates.28 This channel displays a huge dis-smoothing 
effect in Finland, Australia, Sweden and the US, while it has a considerable positive effect 
in Switzerland. Overall, the real exchange rate appreciates in some countries (such as 
the US), implying a negative risk sharing role of real exchange rate adjustments; but it 
depreciates in other countries (such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, and 
Switzerland), showing a positive risk sharing role. The smoothing role of the factor market 
channel is significantly positive in Ireland, Italy and the U.S., but significantly negative in 
Portugal and Canada. Ireland records simultaneously positive GDP growth rates and 
negative net factor income figures, presumably due to outward income flows originated 
by foreign investments of multinational companies. The smoothing role of international 
transfers is always very small although significantly positive in Austria, Germany, Portugal 
and Spain, but significantly negative in Canada and Norway. As regards government 
consumption, it does not contribute to significantly smooth private consumption in any 
country, acting counter-cyclically and thus provoking dis-smoothing in several instances, 
as indicated by the negative estimates. This is so especially for Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France and Sweden, with average dis-smoothing over 10% for the sample period 
analyzed.  
 
                                           
26 Although the magnitude is huge in terms of risk sharing, the changes are not too large in terms of the actual 
unit of changes in each variable. For example, suppose the nominal exchange rate depreciates by 0.5% 
when GDP increases by 1% under GDP shocks. Then, our risk sharing measure implies that the risk sharing 
through nominal exchange rate channel is 50%.  
27 Notice that in our results the ratio of foreign to domestic price level increases but the nominal exchange rate 
appreciates, and this appreciation leads to the real exchange rate appreciation. Presumably, positive 
productivity shocks generate an excess supply that decreases the domestic price level, but it induces capital 
inflows, leading to nominal exchange rate appreciation. These offsetting responses of the two real exchange 
rate components are consistent with the mixed empirical results that characterize the large literature on 
the Balassa-Samuleson hypothesis (see Peltonen and Sager, 2009). 
28 Notice that some countries share a common currency, the euro, since 1999, while others do not. 
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1960-2014 Factor 
mark. 
Intern. 
Transf. 
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markets 
RS on total 
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Govern. 
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RS on 
private  
cons. 
Relative 
price 
Exchange 
Rate 
RS with 
valuation 
effect 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1)+(2)+(3) (4) 
(1)+(2) 
+(3)+(4) 
(5) (6) 
(1)+(2)+(3) 
+(4)+(5)+(6) 
Austria 1 3** 39*** 43*** -10** 33*** 28 -57 5 
Belgium 3 -2 67*** 68*** -6 61*** 7 -18 51 
Denmark -2 4 22** 25*** -15* 10 34*** -32 12 
Finland -2 -1 68*** 65*** -11*** 54*** 17 -92** -21 
France -1 -2 32*** 29*** -11** 18** 14 -23 10 
Germany 2 2* 29*** 33*** 1 34*** 24*** -75* -17 
Greece 1 0 17*** 17*** 2 19*** 15*** -5 29** 
Ireland 6* 1 25*** 29*** 0 30*** 0 22* 53*** 
Italy 2** 0 15*** 17*** -8*** 9** -17*** 21 13 
Netherlands 6 0 33*** 39*** 0 39*** 20*** 15 74** 
Portugal -6** 6*** 14* 14** 3 17** 32*** -52** -3 
Spain 0 1** 13*** 15*** -1 14*** 22*** -43* -7 
Sweden -4 0 46*** 43*** -12** 31*** 34*** -80** -15 
UK 0 1 18*** 19*** -2 17*** 13 -18 12 
Australia 2 0 46*** 47*** 1 48*** 23*** -113*** -43 
Canada -2* -1** 47*** 44*** -4 40*** 23*** -40 22 
Japan -1 1 25*** 25*** -6*** 19*** 22*** 16 57 
New 
Zealand -4 -1 35*** 31*** 1 31*** 22*** -60** -6 
Norway 3 -3*** 83*** 83*** -6** 77*** 23*** 16 116*** 
Switzerland 13 1 29** 44*** -2 42*** 11* 91* 143*** 
United 
States 2* 1 21*** 23*** -3* 20*** 18*** -104*** -66* 
Mean 
Group 1 0 34*** 36 -4*** 32 18*** -30*** 20 
 
Table 1 – Estimation results of country-specific impact risk sharing for years 1960-2014. 
*, ** and *** denote coefficients that are statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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To describe the dynamic behavior of risk sharing channels, Figure 1 shows the 
Mean Group estimator for the impulse response functions.29 Its first column of graphs 
documents the average response to a shock to GDP growth of the various risk sharing 
channels, and ultimately of consumption growth (at constant world prices). The results 
are normalized by the total effect of a shock cumulated after 5 years as in Asdrubali and 
Kim (2004). The first graph in the first column is the response of GDP to a GDP shock, 
indicating a permanent effect in terms of the GDP level. The dynamic response of GDP 
resembles those to random walk productivity shocks in Baxter and Crucini (1995) and 
Baxter (1995), exhibiting a further increase in the second year. The graphs below 
illustrate the dynamic profile of the different channels. The results document that, on 
average, most of risk sharing is achieved through the credit markets channel, which on 
impact is able to smooth around 30% of the shock although it plays a negative role in the 
second to the fourth years after the shock. The computed short-term response of the 
credit market channel entails a degree of consumption smoothing that in a standard 
permanent income framework would be “excessive” (see Asdrubali and Kim 2004). 
However, this “excess smoothness” would be perfectly compatible with a consumption 
model based on an isoelastic utility function; in addition, it should be noted that the shock 
being smoothed here only contains the idiosyncratic GDP component, which could 
reasonably follow a pattern of intertemporal smoothing different from the overall GDP 
innovation. 
                                           
29 The dotted lines reported in the plot of the impulse response functions represent 95% confidence intervals 
computed based on equation (2.12). 
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Figure 1. Mean Group impulse response functions from the heterogeneous panel VAR 
 
The factor markets and international transfers channels do not seem to provide 
any risk sharing at any lag. We detect a significant and positive contribution – around 
20% – of the relative price channel in the first period but a persistent negative role in the 
third to the fifth years. Nominal exchange rate adjustments play a negative role in the 
first two years.30 These risk sharing responses through valuation effects are 
complemented by the repercussions of the changes in real exchange rate components on 
next period’s output (price effect) and thus on next period’s consumption smoothing. 
Such repercussions can be inferred from the 6th and 7th columns, which show an 
amplifying effect of relative price changes on the next periods’ output, and an amplifying 
effect of nominal exchange rate changes on the second period’s output followed by a 
mitigating effect in successive periods. This evidence suggests that, after a positive 
output shock, the domestic price level decreases on impact; while such a decrease 
contributes to contemporaneous risk sharing (the valuation effect), it may also produce 
                                           
30 Nominal exchange rate appreciation may lead to domestic price falls in later periods. 
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further output increases in successive periods (the price effect), which in turn would have 
to be buffered. Conversely, after a positive output shock, the nominal exchange rate 
appreciates on impact; while such appreciation reduces contemporaneous risk sharing 
(the valuation effect), it may also produce an output decrease in the next period (price 
effect), albeit followed by output rises in successive periods. Finally, although government 
consumption provides dis-smoothing on impact, it plays a positive role in the second and 
third years after the shock.31  
Figures 1a to 4a in Appendix 2 show the impulse response functions for selected 
countries: US, Japan, Germany and Italy. Here we can uncover heterogeneous patterns 
not evident from the results obtained for the whole set of countries. For instance, the 
factor markets channel provokes dis-smoothing in Japan, while it has the opposite effect 
in the US and the two European countries. However, country heterogeneity runs deeper, 
and involves the dynamics of channels’ responses. Additionally, in Japan the credit 
markets channel does not turn to dis-smoothing the initial shock but keeps smoothing 
before its effect dies out. . Risk sharing via government consumption provokes a negative 
contemporaneous smoothing but a positive and persistent lagged smoothing effect in the 
U.S. and Italy. However, government consumption plays a non-negative role at all 
horizons with a significant positive effect in the third year in Germany. Dynamic patterns 
of smoothing through relative price adjustment are also different across countries. In the 
U.S., Japan, and Germany, we detected contemporaneous positive but lagged negative 
risk sharing, whereas in Italy we found persistent negative smoothing.  
To show a full picture for all the countries and check if heterogeneity is present 
also in the dynamic behavior of the channels, Figure 2 presents for the 21 countries in 
our sample the impulse response functions of the total amount of risk sharing, obtained 
as the sum of the amounts smoothed through the six channels presented in this paper. 
In the horizontal axis we represent the number of years after a GDP shock hits a country 
and in the vertical line the total amount of risk sharing achieved each year after the GDP 
shock. We do not plot confidence bands to avoid cluttering. The values at impact bring 
out the heterogeneity that we saw in Table 1, ranging from negative to positive 
smoothing. In this graph, we can see that heterogeneous responses appear not only in 
the first period but also in later periods. In particular, the heterogeneity in the second 
period responses is as large as that in the first period. 
 
                                           
31 To some extent this may be the consequence of intertemporal government budget constraints. 
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Figure 2. Impulse response functions of total risk sharing including all six channels for the 
21 countries in the OECD sample. 
 
Figure 3 decomposes Figure 2 by the impulse response functions for the six channels 
considered in this paper. We can see that the channels do not behave all alike, with most 
of the heterogeneity arising through nominal effective exchange rate changes (bottom, 
right). In addition, the relative price channel also shows a substantial heterogeneity. 
However, we can see that heterogeneity is also present in the remaining channels. The 
role of factor markets (top left panel) ranges from smoothing to dis-smoothing depending 
on the country. The credit markets channel (second row, left panel) always presents a 
positive behavior on impact but the degree of risk sharing achieved by this channel is 
quite different across countries. In subsequent years, we observe some dis-smoothing, 
which in two-thirds of the countries substantially offsets the impact smoothing effect. This 
result is in line with Asdrubali and Kim (2004), but illustrates that the dis-smoothing role 
of the credit market channel only involves some countries. International transfers (top 
right panel) is perhaps the most homogeneous channel and practically does not play a 
role for any country. Government consumption (second row, right panel) either provokes 
dis-smoothing on impact or, alternatively, is ineffective. As we have seen also in Table 1, 
this means that some governments act counter-cyclically, provoking further dis-
smoothing. This channel exhibits adjustment dynamics later, however only for part of the 
countries.  
Overall, we can conclude that the degree of heterogeneity is remarkable with 
respect to the nominal effective exchange rate channels, quite high in the relative price 
and credit channels, and non-negligible also in factor markets and government 
consumption channels. Only international transfers do seem to behave similarly for all 
countries, practically exerting no smoothing. 
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Figure 3. Impulse response functions for the 6 channels: factor markets, international 
transfers, credit markets, government consumption, relative prices and nominal 
exchange rates for the 21 countries in the OECD sample. 
 
Since our sample is quite large and encompasses different periods, risk sharing 
might have reasonably varied over time. In order to provide a description of the 
evolutionary pattern of the shock absorption capabilities of risk sharing, we computed 
rolling-window estimates of the country-specific VARs. The first subperiod covers 1960-
1990. We add/remove a year at the end/beginning of the subperiod and repeat the 
estimation. We proceed in the same way until we reach 2016. For each subperiod, we 
have computed the Mean Group impulse response functions. Figure 4 shows the 
evolution of total risk sharing on impact using this method, for the traditional 
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decomposition (top panel), adding government consumption (medium panel) and 
including also the effect of the real effective exchange rate (bottom panel). The year 
that appears on the horizontal axes is the ending year of each subperiod. 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of risk sharing on impact. Mean Group estimates (continuous red 
line) with 95% confidence bands (dotted blue line) using a rolling window. 
 
From Figure 4, we observe that risk sharing through the three traditional channels 
increased slightly through the late 1990s, then decreased henceforth, although it seems 
to be slightly recovering in the very last years.32  We observe a similar pattern when 
we add government consumption smoothing. When taking into account the real 
effective exchange rate channels, we record a strong decrease in the extent of 
consumption smoothing at international prices in the last 15 years, so that risk sharing 
remains positive for the first half of the period, but tends to be zero or negative in the 
second half. In particular, the extent of risk sharing starts to fall in the late 1990s, and 
has only slightly recovered to non-negative terrain in the latest years. To shed some 
light on the mechanisms underlying these patterns, Figure 5 presents the evolution of 
risk sharing for the different channels. As in Figure 4, the year that appears on the 
horizontal axes is the ending year of each subperiod. Note that the three most important 
risk sharing mechanisms are confirmed to be the credit markets, the relative price and 
the nominal exchange rate channels. All three exhibit the historical pattern described 
above. However, the annihilation of total risk sharing at the start of the century reflects 
mostly the nominal exchange rate effect. Indeed, before 2002, risk sharing via nominal 
exchange rate adjustments is not significant, but decreases sharply afterwards and is 
significantly negative in later periods, recovering in the most recent years. The role of 
relative price adjustment has always been positive; we notice a reduction in its effect 
and in the uncertainty around it, perhaps due to convergence in inflation rates, which 
                                           
32 This is consistent with Sørensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007) and Leibrecht and Scharler (2012), who detect 
a rise in these channels for OECD countries from 1993 to 2003 and from 1988 to 2004, respectively, and 
with Rangvid, Santa-Clara, and Schmeling (2016), who estimate a sample of OECD countries from 1875 to 
2012 using rolling windows. However, this evolution is not fully consistent with studies (Kose et al. 2009 
or Bai and Zhang 2012) that use different data sources to show a fall in OECD countries' risk sharing during 
the globalization era. 
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characterized industrial economies in the last 20 years.33 Risk sharing through credits 
markets has always been significantly positive. It started at higher levels but it seems 
to have stabilized in later times at around 30%. Although not significant, we can observe 
that risk sharing achieved through the factor markets channel has shown a slightly 
positive trend since the mid-2000s and especially in the last part of the period. The 
behavior of risk sharing achieved through international transfers and government 
consumption has been relatively stable over time, at a level of zero in the former case 
and dis-smoothing at around 5% in the latter case. 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of risk sharing on impact through the channels. Mean Group 
estimates (continuous red line) with 95% confident bands (dotted blue lines) using a 
rolling window. 
 
Our set-up allows analyzing the effect of shocks to each of the 6 risk sharing 
channels on GDP growth and on the other channels. This perspective will not only shed a 
light on the feedback mechanisms generated by each shock, but will also uncover patterns 
of substitutability between channels. The second to sixth columns of graphs in Figure 1 
show the cross-country average impulse responses to shocks in each channel of risk 
sharing.  Interestingly, the credit market channel offsets shocks to other risk sharing 
channels, except for relative price and nominal exchange rate adjustments: shocks to the 
factor market and international transfer channels are contemporaneously offset by an 
opposite response of the credit market channel. A shock to the government consumption 
channel is later offset by the credit market channel. In addition, a positive shock in the 
relative price leads to a negative response of nominal exchange rate and vice versa, which 
may imply that they are substitutes. Also interestingly, shocks to the factor market, credit 
market, and government consumption channels elicit a fall in GDP in the following years 
while shocks to relative price and nominal exchange rate channels lead to a rise in GDP.34 
These substitutability patterns may help explain the muted – and eventually positive – 
                                           
33 The scarce role of real exchange rate adjustments in the first subperiod – resulting from mutually offsetting 
relative price smoothing and nominal exchange rate dis-smoothing – is consistent with the results in 
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) for OECD countries. 
34 Shocks to each channel represent particular types of shocks, which may affect GDP. A static framework would 
not capture such a feedback relation from channels to GDP, which is one of the advantages of our dynamic 
framework. 
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response of total risk sharing to shocks during the financial crisis, as illustrated in Figures 
4 and 5. 
Looking at the results by country, we can extract some patterns of behavior. In 
general, once a channel is hit by a shock, the remaining channels either do not react or 
react negatively, meaning in this last case, that the channels act to a certain degree as 
substitutes. This means that, for example, a financial shock hampering the inflow of 
dividends and interest payments from abroad is partially offset by an enhanced recourse 
to borrowing in the credit market. 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
 
We have estimated the degree of risk sharing among industrialized OECD countries 
using a heterogeneous panel VAR model that can cope with the issue of endogeneity of 
output and appropriately take into account dynamics and feedback among the channels 
and the channels and GDP. Since the restriction of homogeneity does not fit well for all 
the countries in the sample, we have relaxed this assumption. As pointed out by some 
authors, such as Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014), risk sharing was not homogeneous across 
countries during the recent recession and subsequent sovereign debt crisis, and 
collapsed in the GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Then, the 
heterogeneous panel VAR model is more suited to estimate risk sharing among this set 
of countries.  
On the whole, our results demonstrate that the extent of risk sharing is strikingly 
different across countries, especially if we take into account valuation effects through 
the real effective exchange rates. Even neglecting this new channel, the country-specific 
magnitude of risk sharing on impact ranges from around 15% to over 80%. In addition, 
dynamics are also quite diverse across countries; for example, risk sharing through 
lending and borrowing, while quite effective on impact, provokes dis-smoothing for two 
thirds of the countries on the second year and to more countries on subsequent periods, 
although the dis-smoothing effect diminishes along the years.  
We have also identified new channels for consumption smoothing. Government 
consumption accounted for 4% of dis-smoothing on average during the sample period. 
The results also show the negative risk sharing effect of the real exchange rate, driven 
by the dis-smoothing role played by the movements of the nominal exchange rate, only 
partially offset by relative price adjustments.  
Overall, the average period estimates and impulse responses documented in this 
study paint a composite picture of the overall behavior of risk sharing channels, both 
over time and in their functional dynamics. For the OECD sample as a whole, we confirm 
through 2016 the strong smoothing role played by credit markets and the small degree 
of risk sharing achieved through factor incomes. The evolution of these risk sharing 
mechanisms is diverse, but the most important channels – namely credit markets and 
real exchange rate adjustments – exhibit slightly positive trends for the first half of the 
period, negative trends afterwards, and a recovery in more recent years.  
This study is essentially an exercise in establishing rigorously some stylized facts on 
risk sharing heterogeneity. Further research should be directed at investigating the 
causes underlying such different degrees of risk sharing across countries. In this regard, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003, 2005) argue that the more specialized a 
country is, the higher its degree of risk sharing should be, as it will be able to hedge 
against its domestic developments by investing in other countries. From a policy 
viewpoint, instead, it would be crucial to identify the most important factors driving a 
wedge between actual and potential risk sharing capacity, in order to direct future 
initiatives at the national and supranational level. 
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6 Appendix 1: Estimation over the time span 1960-2016 
 
1960-2016 Factor 
mark. 
Int. 
Transf. 
Credit  
markets 
RS on total 
 cons. 
Govern. 
cons. 
RS on 
private  
cons. 
Relative 
price 
Exchange 
Rate 
RS with 
valuation 
effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1)+(2)+(3) (4) 
(1)+(2) 
+(3)+(4) 
(5) (6) 
(1)+(2)+(3) 
+(4)+(5)+(6) 
Belgium 2 -2 65*** 65*** -6 59 8*** -22 45 
Denmark -3 5* 24** 26** -15* 11 33 -36 7 
Finland -2 -1 64*** 62*** -11*** 51 16*** -90** -23 
France 0 -1 30*** 29*** -10** 18** 15* -41 -8 
Germany 2 2* 29*** 33*** 1 34 23*** -71* -14 
Greece 1 0 17*** 17*** 2 19 15*** -5 29** 
Ireland 13*** -1 36*** 48*** -3* 45 1*** 31*** 77*** 
Italy 2 0 15*** 17*** -8*** 9 -16*** 18 11 
Netherlands 6 0 33*** 39*** 1 39 21*** 10 70* 
Portugal -6** 6*** 13* 14** 3 17** 32** -52** -3 
Spain 0 1* 13*** 14*** -1 14 22*** -39* -3 
Sweden -3 0 45*** 42*** -12*** 30 34*** -73* -9 
UK 0 1 18*** 19*** -2 17 13*** -16 14 
Australia 2 0 46*** 47*** 0 48 22*** -113*** -43 
Canada -2 -1** 50*** 48*** -4 43 21*** -50* 15 
Japan 0 1* 26*** 27*** -5*** 22 21*** 14 56 
New Zealand -4 -1 36*** 30*** 0 31 23*** -60** -7 
Norway 3 -3*** 81*** 81*** -7** 75 22*** 7 103*** 
Switzerland 13 2 30** 44*** -3 42 10*** 89* 140*** 
United 
States 2* 1 20*** 23*** -3* 19 18*** -107*** -69* 
Mean Group 1 1 35*** 36*** -4*** 32 18*** -32*** 18 
 
Table 1a – Estimation results of country-specific impact risk sharing for years 1960-
2016. *, ** and *** denote coefficients that are statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
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7 Appendix 2: Impulse response functions for selected 
countries 
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Figure 1a – IRFs for the United States, resulting from a VAR over years 1960-2016 
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Figure 2a – IRFs for Japan, resulting from a VAR over years 1960-2016 
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 Figure 3a – IRFs for Germany, resulting from a VAR over years 1960-2016 
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Figure 4a – IRFs for Italy, resulting from a VAR over years 1960-2016 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-
union/contact_en). 
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